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SOCIAL MEDIA, PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS,
AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT*
MARY-ROSE PAPANDREA**

Education officials around the country are grappling with issues
surroundingpublic school teachers' use of social media. Typically
concerned that social media makes it easierfor teachers to engage in
inappropriate communications with their students, officials have
adopted guidelines that prohibit K-12 teachers from using social
media to communicate with their students for noncurricular
purposes. In addition, teachers are frequently punished for content
they or others post on social media even when their students and the
school community were not the intended audience. Currentdoctrine
leaves unclear how much authority schools have to restrict their
teachers' use of social media to communicate with their students or
to control what teacherspost online.
This Article contends that these issues involving social media
magnify pre-existing problems with the First Amendment doctrine
governing public employees generally and teachers in particular
and argues that the doctrine needs significant revisions and
clarifications. The Court's decision under Garcetti v. Ceballos to
strip public employees of their First Amendment rights for speech
made "as employees" pursuantto their official job duties should be
construed narrowly so that it applies only when teachers
communicate with their students for school-related purposes.
Furthermore, teachers should not have to demonstrate that their
speech involves a matter of public concern to be entitled to First
Amendment protection. Instead, this Article argues that in cases
involving noncurricularspeech that relates to the workplace, courts
should apply a robust version of the Pickering balancing test that
recognizes the value of teacher expression even when it does not
involve a matter of public concern and that does not permit a hostile
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community reaction to figure into the calculus. In cases involving
non-school-related expression, this Article contends that courts
should abandon the balancing test and instead give the speech
presumptive constitutionalprotection that can be overcome only if
school officials can demonstrate a significant nexus between that
speech and the teacher'sfitness and ability to perform professional
duties.
With the First Amendment doctrine governing public school
teachers reformed in this way, broad social media bans that restrict
or prohibit a teacher's use of social media to communicate with
students for non-school-relatedpurposes would be unconstitutional,
and the ability of school officials to punish teachers for their online
expression would not be as virtually unlimited as it currently is.
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INTRODUCTION

Ashley Payne was a 24-year-old public high school English
teacher in Georgia when her principal called her into his office to tell
her that she could be suspended because of content on her personal
Facebook page.1 The objectionable content? Standard tourist

photographs of Payne drinking alcohol in European beer gardens and
caf6s during a recent vacation and a comment that she was attending
a trivia contest called "Crazy Bitch Bingo" at a local restaurant. 2
Even though Payne used Facebook's privacy settings, the principal
had learned about the content from an anonymous email claiming
one of Payne's students had seen the pictures and the profanity.3
Around the country, public school districts have punished

teachers like Ms. Payne for content they or others posted on social
media sites. For example, a Virginia teacher who created artwork
using body parts was fired when school officials learned of it;4 a
Nashville teacher was fired after posting "racy" photos of herself on

her MySpace profile page;- a Spanish teacher in Pittsburgh was
suspended for a month without pay when a fellow teacher posted a6
picture of her on Facebook with a stripper at a bachelorette party;

and a Wisconsin middle-school teacher was placed on administrative
leave for posting a picture of herself with a gun on her Facebook

page.7 In other cases, teachers have found their jobs in jeopardy after
1. Maureen Downey, Court Rules Against Ashley Payne in FacebookCase. But More
to Come., ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Oct. 10, 2011, 7:36 PM), http://blogs.ajc.com/get-schooledblog/2011/10/10/court-rules-against-ashley-payne-in-facebook-case/.
2. Id.
3. Maureen Downey, Barrow Teacher Done in by Anonymous "Parent" Email
About Her Facebook Page, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Nov. 13,2009, 3:12 PM), http://blogs.ajc
.com/get-schooled-blog/2009/11/13/barrow-teacher-done-in-by-anonymous-e-mail-withperfect-punctuation/.
4. See Complaint at 7-10, Murmer v. Chesterfield Cnty. Sch. Bd., No. 3:07CV608
(E.D. Va. Oct. 4, 2007), 2007 WL 2914769. For more about the case, see Teacher Hopes To
Get Back at Va. District,FIRST AMEND. CENTER (Oct. 6, 2007), http://www
.firstamendmentcenter.org/teacher-hopes-to-get-back-at-va-district-that-fired-him-overbutt-art.

5. Michael D. Simpson, The Whole World (Wide Web) Is Watching, NEA TODAY,
Apr. 2008, at 17, 17, availableat http://www.nea.org/home/12784.htm.
6. Settlement Reached in Teacher's Stripper Photo Suspension, WPXI.COM
(Pittsburgh) (Aug. 17, 2010, 8:47 AM), http://www.wpxi.com/news/24657376/detail.html
(explaining how the American Civil Liberties Union sued the school district on the
teacher's behalf and achieved reinstatement, back pay, and a monetary award).
7. Tony Galli, Teacher Placed on Leave for Questionable Facebook Posting,
WKOW.CoM (Madison, Wis.) (Feb. 3,2009, 4:36 PM), http://www.wkow.com/Global/story
.asp?S=9781795&nav=menul362_10.
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school officials learned that they complained about their students or

schools on social media sites 8 or made controversial statements about
topics unrelated to their schools or their teaching. 9
In most of these cases, the teachers did not intend to
communicate with their students or other members of their school
communities through social media. Some teachers, like Ms. Payne,
thought they had used privacy settings on their pages that would
prevent students from seeing them,10 or, like the Virginia body-part
artist, had taken great efforts to disguise their identity to prevent their
students from discovering their work." Others simply relied on the
"practical obscurity" the Internet provides.' 2
In an effort to avoid the possibility of inappropriate
communications with students, some states and school districts have
adopted laws or policies restricting electronic communication
between teachers and students, some of which require teachers to
communicate with students only through school-provided or schoolapproved technology and/or provide that online communications
must be limited to school related matters. 3 Other laws ban teachers

8. See, e.g., Maureen Downey, Facebook and Teachers: Still a Potentially Dangerous
Combinationfor Your Career,ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Aug. 23, 2010, 8:52 AM), http://blogs
.ajc.com/get-schooled-blog/2/20/08/23/facebook-and-teachers-still-a-potentially-dangerous
-combination-for-your-career/ (discussing a number of cases where teachers have been
punished for their speech in social media, including a Massachusetts school administrator
who resigned after school officials discovered that she had said on her Facebook page that
the parents in her upscale town were "arrogant" and "snobby" and that she was not
looking forward to the start of school).
9. See, e.g., Tim Padgett, A Teacher Is Back in ClassAfter Anti-Gay Diatribe,but Did
He Really Win?, TIME (Aug. 30, 2011), http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,
2091038,00.html (discussing high school teacher Jerry Buell, a devout Baptist and
American history teacher at a public high school in Florida, who wrote on his personal
Facebook page "that gay marriage is a 'cesspool' that makes him vomit and mocks God").
10. Did the Internet Kill Privacy?, CBSNEwS (Feb. 6, 2011, 7:21 PM), http://www
.cbsnews.com/stories/2011/02/06/sunday/main7323148.shtml.
11. Teacher Hopes To Get Back at Va. District,supra note 4.
12. Kayla Webley, How One Teacher's Angry Blog Sparked a Viral Classroom
Debate, TIME (Feb. 18, 2011), http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2052123,00
.html (recounting how a teacher who wrote a blog critical of schools "maintains what she
wrote was meant only to serve as amusement for herself, her husband and seven of her
friends who read the site").
13. Some policies require teachers to use social networks that the school or district
either hosts or has approved. See, e.g., CMTY. UNIT SCH. DIST. 200, ILL., BOARD OF
EDUCATION POLICY MANUAL 5:135 (2010), availableat http://www.barrington220.org
(stating
that
/cmsflib2/IL01001296/CentricitylModulelnstance5958/Section5-7.11.pdf
employees may communicate with parents and students online only about school-related
matters and only through district-approved networks); cf MASS. AssoC. OF SCH. COMM.,
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from "friending" students in social media networks or otherwise
giving students access to their social media profiles. a4 Still other
regulations warn school employees that they may be subject to
discipline if they use any social networking site inappropriately, even
if the content is not directed at students and does not relate to
POLICY ON FACEBOOK AND SOCIAL NETWORKING WEBSITES FOR MILTON PUBLIC

SCHOOL EMPLOYEES 1 (2011), available at http://www.miltonps.org/documents
/SCPolicyIJNDD.pdf (requiring that all Internet contacts be made through the school
email system). Other policies provide that teachers can use electronic media to
communicate with students or other members of the school community about schoolrelated business only. See, e.g., CHI. PUB. SCH., ILL., CHICAGO PUBLIC SCHOOLS POLICY
MANUAL: ACCEPTABLE USE OF THE CPS NETWORK AND COMPUTER RESOURCES 5
(2009), available at http://policy.cps.k12.il.us/documents/604.1.pdf (explaining that all
emails sent by users in their capacity as representatives of the Chicago Public Schools must
be sent from Board-authorized email systems); DAYTON BD. OF EDUC., OHIO, DAYTON
PUBLIC SCHOOLS POLICY MANUAL: ACCEPTABLE USE AND INTERNET SAFETY FOR

INFORMATIONAL AND EDUCATIONAL TECHNOLOGY 1-2 (2010), available at http://www
that
(providing
.nctq.org/docs/DaytonPolicy-manual-app_2009 doc 23 5 1418.pdf
teachers cannot respond to student-initiated conversations through social media not
approved by the district); ECTOR CNTY., TEX., INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT
EMPLOYEE HANDBOOK (2011-2012) 49, available at http://www.ectorcountyisd.org/17661
0728111231193/lib/176610728111231193/ecisd-employeehandbook.pdf ("An employee
may use electronic media to communicate with a student within the scope of the
professional responsibilities of his or her job.").
14. See Katherine Bindley & Timothy Stenovec, Missouri "Facebook Law" Limits
Teacher-Student Interactions Online, Draws Criticism and Praise, HUFFINGTON POST
(Aug. 3, 2011, 8:58 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/08/03/missouri-facebooklaw n_916716.html; see also DAYTON BD. OF EDUC., OHIO, supra note 13, at 1-2 (stating
that employees may not "friend" students on social media sites unless they are related to
the student and that they may not instant message or text current students or respond to
student-initiated conversations through social media not approved by the district);
GRANITE SCH. DIST., SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, SOCIAL NETWORKING POLICY, ART.
X.C.3. (2010), available at http://www.graniteschools.org/districtpolicies
/teachinglearningservices/Educational%20Technology/3. %2OSocial%2ONetworking%20p
olicy.pdf (explaining that employees may not allow students to access personal social
networking sites); L.A. UNIFIED SCH. DIST., POLICY BULLETIN 3 (Feb. 1, 2012), available
at http://www.lausd.net/lausd/offices/Office-of Communications/BUL-5688.0_SOCIAL
_MEDIAPOLICY.pdf (accepting invitations to non-school-related social networking
sites from "parents, students, or alumni under 18 is strongly discouraged"); MASS. ASSOC.
OF SCH. COMM., supra note 13, at 1 (stating that teachers, staff, and coaches may not list
current students as "friends" on social networking sites); SCH. BD. OF PINELLAS CNTY.,
FLA., BYLAWS AND POLICIES, COMMUNICATIONS WITH STUDENTS VIA ELECTRONIC
MEDIA 253 (2012), available at http://web.pcsb.org/Planning/neola/NewBoardPolicy
Entire.pdf (requiring that employees communicate with students only by school-provided
electronic devices and services); WEYMOUTH PUB. SCH., MASS., EMPLOYEE HANDBOOK
23 (2012), availableat http://www.weymouthschools.org/uploadedFiles/DistrictForms
andInformation/Handbooks/Emp%20Handbook%2011-12[1].pdf (requiring that
electronic communication between personnel and students must be for educational
purposes only and that school staff may not share personal webpages or social media with
current students).
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school. 5 While these laws and policies have typically been passed in
reaction to revelations that teachers had used social media to lure
students into sexual relationships, 16 these social media bans and
restrictions are troublesome given the rapidly increasing importance
of social media a as communication platform and the growing
recognition that social media can be an important pedagogical tool.
Rather than attacking the inappropriate contact itself, these efforts
single out a means of communication.
Although few cases involving teachers and social media have
proceeded to judgment, 7 it is only a matter of time before the current
trickle of cases becomes a torrent. Unfortunately, the doctrine
governing teacher speech rights is nothing short of confusing. Current
doctrine leaves unclear how much authority schools have to restrict
their teachers' use of social media to communicate with their students
or to control what teachers post online. The Supreme Court's
framework for analyzing free speech rights of public employees-like
public school teachers-strips First Amendment protection from
speech they make "as employees" pursuant to their official job
duties."8 The Supreme Court left unclear whether this rule applies in
the educational context given concerns about academic freedom; the
Court also left unexplained how a court should determine whether
expression is pursuant to "official" job duties. In addition, it appears
that speech must involve a matter of public concern to receive
constitutional protection, although the Court and the lower courts
have left it unclear whether this is required in cases involving nonwork-related expression. And even if employees can survive these
two threshold tests, employees still cannot prevail unless they can
demonstrate that their interest in the speech and the value of the
speech outweigh the government's interest in restricting it.
For teachers, the uncertainty does not end there. Some courts
have applied the framework developed for student speech rights to

15. See BD. OF EDUC., SOMERVILLE, N.J., 3000 SERIES: TEACHING STAFF MEMBERS:
INAPPROPRIATE STAFF CONDUCT § 3281 (2005), availableat http://www.somervillenjkl2
.org/cms/lib5/NJlOO1815/Centricity/Domain/351/3000%20Series.pdf (stating that school
staff members are "advised to be concerned about" the use of emails, text messages, social
networking sites, or any medium "that is directed and/or available to pupils or for public
display"); L.A. UNIFIED SCH. DIST., supra note 14, at 3 (warning that school employees
who engage in the "inappropriate use" of social networking sites are subject to discipline).
16. See Bindley & Stenovec, supra note 14.
17. See, e.g., Snyder v. Millersville Univ., No. 07-1660, 2008 WL 5093140, at *1, *15-16
(E.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 2008).
18. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006).
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teachers' in-school expression and have permitted schools to punish
teachers for any speech that interferes with legitimate pedagogical
goals. 19 Although it is unclear whether this alternative framework is
more or less speech protective than the public employee framework,
the reality is that neither doctrine offers teachers much protection for
their curricular and extracurricular speech.
Part I discusses the increasingly important role social media is
playing in public schools around the country and the various
objections some school officials and parents have to this
development. Part II discusses the uncertainty regarding the
appropriate doctrinal framework for analyzing the First Amendment
claims of public school teachers. Although the Supreme Court has
developed separate frameworks for analyzing the speech rights of
government employees and public school students, the lower courts
disagree about which of these frameworks applies to public school
teachers. Part III argues that the public employee speech doctrine
should apply in cases involving teachers, but this framework requires
significant clarifications and revisions. The Court's decision to strip
public employees of their First Amendment rights for speech made
''as employees" pursuant to their official job duties should be
construed narrowly so that it applies only when teachers use social
media to communicate with their students for school-related
purposes. Furthermore, teachers should not have to demonstrate that
their speech involves a matter of public concern in order to bring a
First Amendment claim. In cases involving school-related speech,
courts should apply a vigorous balancing test that weighs the value of
the speech against the government's interest in regulation. Moreover,
courts should not permit a hostile community reaction to factor into
the calculus. Most importantly, courts should not apply a balancing
test to expression that is not school-related but should instead afford
this noncurricular speech presumptive constitutional protection. This
presumption can be overcome only if school officials can demonstrate
a significant nexus between the speech and the teacher's fitness and
ability to perform her educational duties.
Under this proposed approach, broad social media bans that
restrict or prohibit a teacher's use of social media to communicate
with students would be unconstitutional. In addition, schools would
find it more difficult to punish teachers for the things they say and do
on social media. At the same time, this approach would still not
19. See infra Part II.C.

1604

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90

provide teachers the First Amendment rights ordinary citizens enjoy.
Schools would maintain the power to restrict student-teacher
conversations that are truly harmful and to punish teachers who
engage in expression that reveals them to be unfit for the profession.
I. SOCIAL MEDIA IN SCHOOLS

The role of social media in public schools is currently a divisive
issue. Although it is increasingly common for school officials around
the country-from individual schools2" to school districts2 ' to the U.S.
Department of Education 2 2 -to use social media sites like Facebook,
Twitter, and YouTube to communicate with students, parents, and
the interested public about school-related events and issues,23 the use
of social media by teachers to communicate with their students is
highly controversial. In addition, teachers who use social media in
their personal lives have faced severe punishments for posting
content that school officials claim interferes with a school's
educational mission, sets a bad example for students, or is otherwise
inappropriate or unprofessional.
A.

PedagogicalUses

Given that 73% of children ages 12-17 use social media and even
elementary school students use social media websites like WebKinz
and Club Penguin, 24 it is not surprising that some educators have
embraced social media as a valuable pedagogical tool. 25 Many
teachers around the country have successfully integrated various
social media platforms like Twitter and Facebook into their

20. See Kimberly Melton, Schools Use Facebook, Twitter to Get Out Their Message,
OREGONLIVE.COM (Sept. 24, 2009,6:22 PM), http://www.oregonlive.com/education/index
.ssfI2009/09/schools turnto facebooktwitt.html.
21. See, e.g., CHAPEL HILL-CARRBORO CITY SCHS., http://www2.chccs.k12.nc.us

/education/components/board/ (last visited May 8, 2012) (providing links to the school
district's Facebook, Twitter, and Flickr pages).
22. See, e.g., US Dept of Education, TWITTER, http://twitter.com/usedgov (Twitter
feed for the U.S. Department of Education).
23. Michelle R. Davis, Social Networking Goes to School, EDUC. WK.: DIGITAL

DIRECTIONS (June 14,2010), http://www.edweek.org/dd/articles/2010/06/16/03networking
.h03.html.
24. Id.
25. See generally Heather L. Carter, Teresa S. Foulger & Ann Dutton Ewbank, Have
You Googled Your Teacher Lately? Teachers' Use of Social Networking Sites, 89 PHI
DELTA KAPPAN 681 (2008) (explaining how increasing numbers of teachers are using
social media in their classrooms and personal lives).
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classrooms, and their reasons for doing so vary.26 These teachers
claim that social media allows them to improve communication with
their students individually and as a class. 27 Some teachers use
Facebook and other social media websites to remind students about
homework assignments and tests.' Teachers have also discovered
that social media tools like Facebook make it easier for students to
complete group projects and to continue the dialogue about their
schoolwork outside of the classroom. 29 In addition, social media helps
teachers reach and engage shy students who are more willing to
contribute to the class conversation if they can do so anonymously or
at least not in person in the classroom."a
Participating in social media can enhance communication and
collaboration, facilitate social interaction, promote creativity, and
help develop writing and technical skills a1 For example, a pilot
project in North Carolina public schools allows students to use their
smart phones to communicate with their math teachers outside of
school hours; in addition, students may collaborate with their fellow
students through instant messages, blogs, and videos explaining how
they solved a problem. 2 As a result of this project, students have
reported they are more motivated and interested in math, and greater
numbers have demonstrated proficiency in math."a
Social media also may help teachers and administrators reach
troubled students who need more than just help with their academic
work.3 4 Teachers can provide needed emotional attention and moral
support to overcome personal problems, such as abuse or family

26. See Jessica Gross, Embracingthe Twitter Classroom, HUFFINGTON POST (May 18,
6
2009), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jessica-gross/embracing-the-twitter-cla-b_2044 3
.html.
27. Carter et al., supra note 25, at 682-83.
28. Id. at 683.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 682-83; see also Gross, supra note 26 (noting that shy students are more
willing to speak up online).
31. Davis, supra note 23.
32. Id.
33. Tina Barseghian, Mobile Learning Proves to Benefit At-Risk Students,
MIND/SHIFT (July 20, 2011, 1:00 PM), http://mindshift.kqed.org/2011/07/mobile-learningproves-to-benefit-at-risk-students/. Outside of the classroom, student club organizers have
also found social media to be an effective way of attracting, retaining, and communicating
with their members. See Carter et al., supra note 25, at 683.
34. David Murphy, Missouri Bans Student-Teacher Facebook Friendships,
PCMAG.COM (July 31, 2011), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2389485,00.asp.

1606

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90

difficulties.35 Students looking for adult mentoring and guidance
might find it difficult to connect with a teacher during school hours;
social networks can offer an easier and more approachable method of
reaching teachers and school officials.36

Additionally, more and more schools are recognizing the
importance of bringing social media into the classroom so that young
people can learn how to use social media safely and effectively.37
These educational efforts include teaching students about the dangers
of sexting and cyberbullying; the potential for reputational harm;
threats to students' privacy and safety that might result from posting
personal or inappropriate information; the social isolation and
depression that might result from spending too much time on
Facebook and other social media websites; and the undue influence
of websites that promote unsafe and self-destructive behaviors like
bulimia, drug use, and self-cutting.3 8 Schools can also play an
important role in educating students about plagiarism, intellectual
of information, and
property rights, the credibility of sources
39
generally.
citizenship
digital
responsible
Teachers' Use of Social Media in Their Professionaland Personal
Lives
Like students, teachers can also benefit from using social media
outside of the classroom in their professional and personal capacities.
As professionals, some teachers use social media to connect with
other teachers, communicate with their unions, and learn more about
innovative teaching techniques.4" In their personal lives, teachers can
use social media to keep in touch with their friends and family and to
make connections with those with whom they have fallen out of
B.

35. danah boyd, When Teachers and Students Connect Outside School, APOPHENIA

(May 27, 2009), http://www.zephoria.org/thoughts/archives/2009/05/27/when-teachers_a
.html.
36. Id.
37. Sarah Kessler, The Case for Social Media in Schools, MASHABLE (Sept. 29, 2010),
http://mashable.com/2010/O9/29/social-media-in-schooU; see also Gross, supra note 26
(discussing benefits of using social media in the classroom).
38. Social Media and Kids: Some Benefits, Some Worries, AM. ACAD. PEDIATRICS

(Mar. 28, 2011), http://www.aap.org/en-us/about-the-aap/aap-press-room/Pages/SocialMedia-and-Kids-Some-Benefits,-Some-Worries.aspx.
39. Stephanie Clifford, TeachingAbout Web Includes Troublesome Parts, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 8, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/09/education/09cyberkids.html.
40. Davis, supra note 23.
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touch.41 Although most social media connections reflect pre-existing

offline connections, social media also brings together strangers with
similar hobbies, interests, and political views.42
Numerous teachers have faced discipline for posting what school

officials regard as inappropriate and unprofessional content on social
media, even though the content was posted during their personal
time.43 School officials have punished teachers for posting content
that sets a poor example for their students because it involves sex,
drugs, alcohol, or profanity."a In other instances, school districts have
punished teachers and other school employees for content on social

media sites that casts their schools in a negative light. This expression
might take the form of negative comments about the school or
students 45 or offensive comments about non-school-related topics.46
Although perhaps some teachers post this sort of content
knowing that school administrators will see it, anyone who places
information in digital form runs the risk that an unintended audience
will discover it. 47 To avoid the problems of controlling the audience
for their information, some teachers simply avoid using social media
entirely or engage in significant self-censorship to post only the most
benign content. 48 Even the teachers who take this conservative
approach to social media, however, have no control over the

41. Aaron Smith, Why Americans Use Social Media, PEW RES. CENTER (Nov. 15,
2011), http://www.pewinternet.org/-/media//Files/Reports/2011/Why%20Americans
%20Use%20Social%20Media.pdf.
42. danah m. boyd & Nicole B. Ellison, Social Network Sites: Definition, History, and
Scholarship, 13 J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. 210,210 (2008), available at http://jcmc
.indiana.edu/voll3/issuelboyd.ellison.html.
43. See Carter et al., supra note 25, at 682-83.
44. Id. at 683.
45. Zach Patberg & Carol Lawrence, Facebook Comments Prompt Parentsto Remove
Children from Teacher's Class, NORTHJERSEY.COM (Apr. 3,2011), http://www
.northjersey.com/news/119115024_Facebook.comments.prompt-parentsto_removechi
drenfromteacher s class.html (giving numerous examples of teachers who were
punished for making derogatory comments about their students).
46. See, e.g., Padgett, supra note 9 (discussing a teacher who made offensive anti-gay
marriage comments on Facebook).
47. Lance Ulanoff, Your Digital Debris Is Haunting You, PCMAG.COM (June 9,
2011), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2386635,00.asp.
48. See Frederic D. Stutzman & Woodrow N. Hartzog, Boundary Regulation in Social
Media 5 (Oct. 8, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), availableat http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstractid=1566904. Indeed, many educators suggest that teachers should
avoid social media entirely. See, e.g., Jodi Weigand, Pitfalls Await Teachers Who Publicize
Lives on Social Media, PITrSBURGH TRIB.-REV. (Aug. 18,2011), http://www
.pittsburghlive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/news/state/s_752099.html.
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information others may post about them.4 9 Furthermore, many active
users of social media sites discover that the design of these platforms
makes it difficult for them to control the disclosure of information in
the same way they can in the offline world.5'
With more than 800 million users, Facebook is the world's most
popular social networking website.5 1 It is not surprising, then, that
Facebook frequently plays a role in cases where teachers are
punished for posting inappropriate content.52 But another reason
Facebook is so often involved in these cases is that it is difficult for
users to present multiple personas to different audiences.53 Indeed,
until May 2008, family, friends, acquaintances, work colleagues, and
professional contacts were all merged online as a single social group
and all indiscriminately labeled "friends.

' 54

Although Facebook now

allows users to place contacts into different "lists" of friends, this
process is imperfect and burdensome, especially for those who are not
tech-savvy. 55 Furthermore, information on Facebook is public by
default.56 Even when Facebook users believe they are using the
49. See, e.g., Settlement Reached with School District over Teacher Who Was
Suspended over Photo with Stripperat Bachelorette Party,ACLU (Aug. 17, 2010), http://
www.aclu.org/free-speech/settlement-reached-school-district-over-teacher-who-wassuspended-over-photo-stripper-ba; Update: Jacksonville Teacher Resigns, KETK NBC
(Dec. 30, 2010), http://www.ketknbc.com/news/update-jacksonville-teacher-resigns (noting
that a teacher resigned after someone else posted inappropriate pictures of her online).
50. Paul Adams, Slideshow Presentation at the Voices That Matter Web Design
Conference: The Real Life Social Network v2, slides 188-206 (June 2010), available at
http://www.slideshare.net/padday/the-real-life-social-network-v2.
51. Facebook,N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/business/companies
/facebookinc/index.htm (last updated Apr. 9,2012).
52. Harry Ess Belch, Teachers Beware! The Dark Side of Social Networking,
LEARNING & LEADING WITH TECH., Dec.-Jan. 2011-2012, at 15, 16, availableat http://
www.iste.org/learn/publications/learning-and-leading/issues/Feature TeachersBeware
(listing
several examples involving
_TheDarkSide ofSocialNetworking.aspx
Facebook).
53. Jens Binder, Andrew Howes & Alistair Sutcliffe, The Problem of Conflicting
Social Spheres: Effects of Network Structure on Experienced Tension in Social Network
Sites, CHI, 2009, at 965, 967 (Apr. 7, 2009).
54. Id.
55. For a discussion of Facebook's "list" function and recent efforts to improve it, see
Jason Kincaid, Facebook Officially Unveils Smart Friend Lists, TECHCRUNCH (Sept. 13,
2011), http://techcrunch.com/2011/09/13/facebook-officially-unveils-smart-friend-lists/.
Some of these efforts have been a response to newcomer Google+'s "Circles," which
allows users to organize contacts into groups. Id. Google+ Circles may represent an
improvement, but using it can be tedious and inconvenient. See Peter Pachal, Google
Circles: The Dumbest Thing About Google+, PCMAG.COM (June 29,2011), http://www
.pcmag.corn/article2/0,2817,2387808,00.asp.
56. Why Facebook Won't Be Number One Forever: The Oversimplification of Identity
Online Through the Blurringof 'Selves,' ONLINE CONF. ON NETWORKS & CMTYS. (Apr.

20121

SOCIAL MEDIA AND PUBLIC SCHOOLS

1609

maximum privacy settings Facebook offers-and therefore having
"private" conversations with friends-these privacy settings are
notoriously unreliable and easily bypassed. 7 Social science research
demonstrates that although people frequently intend to share
personal information with a small subset of their "friends," they end
up sharing information with many more people than they would
offline.58
In addition to privacy and access controls, some social media
users rely on a number of methods of "boundary regulation" to
control the audience for their content.59 These methods include
anonymous or pseudonymous participation; the maintenance of
multiple social profiles or the use of multiple social media sites; and
reliance on the "practical obscurity" of most material on the
Internet.' None of these methods is perfect, and teachers around the
country have paid the price for this imperfection when parents,
students, and school officials see content that teachers often did not
intend for those audiences.61
C.

Resistance to Social Media in Schools

Despite the pervasive use of social media in society generally, 62
some school administrators and parents contend that using social
media in schools causes more harm than good.63 In addition to
questioning the effectiveness of integrating technology into the
classroom, 64 some express concern that encouraging students to use
24, 2011), http://networkconference.netstudies.org/2011/04/why-facebook-won't-benumber-one-forever-the-oversimplification-of-identity-online-through-the-blurring-of'selves'/.
57. Kurt Opsahl, Facebook's Eroding Privacy Policy: A Timeline, ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER FOUND. (Apr. 28, 2010), http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2010/04/facebooktimeline.
58. See Why Facebook Won't Be Number One Forever: The Oversimplification of
Identity Online Through the Blurring of 'Selves,' supra note 56. Although on average
Facebook users have 180 "friends," they tend to interact regularly with only four to six
people. See Adams, supranote 50, at slide 105.
59. See Stutzman & Hartzog, supranote 48, at 13-15.
60. Id.
61. See supra text accompanying notes 10-12.
62. A recent survey reported that sixty-six percent of online adults use social
networking websites like Facebook, Linkedln, Twitter, or MySpace. See Smith, supra note
41.
63. Davis, supra note 23. Indeed, many schools still block access to popular social
networks like Twitter and Facebook. Id.
64. See, e.g., Matt Richtel, In Classroom of Future, Stagnant Scores, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
3, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2Oll/09/04/technology/technology-in-schools-faces-
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social media will lead to more online harassment and sexual
predators.65 Others are worried that using social media as an
educational tool intrudes inappropriately into the personal and social
lives of students and undermines the appropriate professional
boundary between teacher and student.'
Increasingly, school officials around the country have become so
concerned about this boundary issue that they have adopted school
policies forbidding or heavily restricting teachers' use of social media
to contact students.67 These policies vary widely and reflect school
officials' uncertainty about social media. Some of the more extreme
policies require that school employees use only their school email
accounts to communicate with students or use social media to
68
communicate with their students only about school-related matters.
Others mandate that employees not "friend" students or otherwise
give them access to their personal webpages or social media
networks.69
II. FREE SPEECH RIGHTS OF K-12 PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS

Courts have not yet adopted a consistent framework for cases
involving teachers and social media. Although the Supreme Court has
a relatively well-developed line of cases addressing the First
Amendment rights of public employees, some lower courts have
instead applied the Supreme Court's decisions made in the context of
student speech rights. As more cases involving teachers and social
media work their way through the judicial system, courts will first
have to determine the proper doctrinal framework for analyzing these
kinds of claims. The following Part examines these two frameworks
questions-on-value.html?pagewanted=all (reporting that although schools spend billions
on new technology, proving the educational value of such tools is difficult).
65. Davis, supra note 23.
66. Id.
67. Jennifer Preston, Rules to Stop Pupil and Teacherfrom Getting Too Social Online,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17,2011, at Al.

68. See, e.g., CHI. PUB. SCH., supra note 13, at 5 ("Users are not allowed to use thirdparty email systems ... in their capacity as representatives of Chicago Public Schools.");
MASS. Assoc. OF SCH. COMM., supra note 13, at 1 ("All e-contacts with students should
be through the district's computer and telephone system."); Alexander Russo, School
Board Bans Facebook, Twitter for Teachers, CHICAGONOW (Aug. 10, 2009, 8:16 AM),
http://www.chicagonow.com/district-299-chicago-public-schools-blog/2009/08/schoolboard-bans-facebook-twitter-for-teachers/ ("[R]equiring teachers to use official email for
all communications with students.").
69. DAYTON BD. OF EDUC., OHIO, supra note 13, at 1-2 (stating that employees
cannot "friend" students unless they are related or are a legal guardian).
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with a focus on where they are unclear and how, in practice, they
differ from each other.
A.

CurrentDoctrinal Frameworkfor Public Employees

For decades, courts commonly understood that the First
Amendment placed no restrictions on the ability of the government
to discipline its employees based on their expressive activities.7 ° The
basis for this understanding was a right-privilege distinction; in other
words, being a public school teacher is a privilege, not a right, and the
government is free to condition the exercise of that privilege on the
relinquishment of constitutional rights.71 As Oliver Wendell Holmes
famously said while serving on the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts, "The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk
politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman."72
Over time, the Supreme Court's reliance on the right-privilege
distinction diminished, and the Court instead required any
restrictions on teachers and other public employees to pass
constitutional scrutiny.73 Cases involving public school teachers (on
the secondary and university level) played an important role in this
development. For example, in Keyishian v. Board of Regents,74 the
Court struck down a McCarthy-era law that required university
faculty members to certify that they were not members of communist
or other subversive organizations.75 The Court explained that "the
First Amendment ... does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of

orthodoxy over the classroom. The vigilant protection of
is nowhere more vital than in the community
constitutional freedoms
' 76
of American schools.

The watershed case for the First Amendment rights of public
school teachers and public employees more generally came in 1968
when the Court decided Pickering v. Board of Education.77 This case
70. See William Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in
ConstitutionalLaw, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439, 1439-40 (1968).

71. Id.
72. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517,517 (Mass. 1892).
73. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1973) (holding that it is well settled
that government employment cannot be denied or penalized "on a basis that infringes [the
employee's] constitutionally protected interests-especially, his interest in freedom of
speech").
74. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
75. Id. at 608-10.
76. Id. at 603 (internal citations omitted).
77. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
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involved a public school teacher who wrote a letter to the editor of a
local newspaper criticizing the school board's funding allocations.78
The Pickering Court explicitly held that public employees retained a
First Amendment right to make statements of public concern even
when they involve the subject matter of their employment.79
Recognizing that teachers' First Amendment rights are not absolute,
the Court established a balancing test that considered "the interests
of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public
concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting
the efficiency of the public services it performs through its
employees."8 Although the Court was unwilling to go so far as to
offer public employees the same protection that ordinary citizens
enjoy for their contributions to public debate, the Court recognized
that public employees, as a class, can offer valuable insights and
opinions regarding the government enterprise in which they are
employed. 81 Applying its new balancing test to the facts at hand, the
Pickering Court first noted that the teacher's letter was not directed
toward his immediate supervisors or coworkers and therefore did not
82
threaten to undermine discipline or harmony in the workplace.
Furthermore, the Court explained, the teacher's letter did not
interfere with the operation of the school system in any way or
undermine his ability to perform his daily duties as a teacher. 83 The
Court concluded the government had no greater interest in
suppressing his speech than it would have in suppressing the same
speech by a member of the general public."4
Pickering recognizes the important contributions government
employees can make to public debate and in some cases offers
meaningful protection for those contributions. As with any balancing
test, however, the outcome of any particular case will depend on the
facts at issue. Indeed, Pickering itself made this clear with its constant
references to the circumstances of that case 85 and caveats that the
78. Id. at 564-65.
79. Id. at 571-72.
80. Id. at 568.
81. Id. (noting that teachers as a class are often in the best position to make valuable
contributions to the public debate about school funding issues).
82. Id. at 569-70.
83. Id. at 572-73.
84. Id. at 574.
85. -See, e.g., id. at 569 (expressing reluctance to "lay down a general standard" for all
cases in which an employee makes statements critical of his supervisors given "the
enormous variety of fact situations"); id. at 573 (reaching its conclusion in light of "the[]
circumstances" of the case); id. at 574 (holding that the First Amendment protects a
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balance reached might be different if a variety of other factors were
present.86 Accordingly, an employee who criticizes a direct supervisor
or coworker or speaks on an issue that is directly related to his job
duties might find that the Pickering balancing test results in an
unfavorable outcome.
Since Pickering, the Supreme Court has placed additional
obstacles in the way of any successful First Amendment claim a
public employee might make.' In Connick v. Myers,' the Supreme
Court held that a court must first determine as a threshold matter
whether the speech at issue involves a matter of public concern
before conducting Pickering's balancing test.89 The Court explained
that government employers must be given "wide latitude" to restrict
employee speech that does not involve a matter of public concern
because federal courts should not get involved in personnel decisions
regarding employee speech that involves a matter "only of personal
interest."9 To determine whether speech satisfies this public concern
requirement, Connick instructed courts to consider the "content,
form, and context" of the speech at issue. 9' Relevant factors might
include whether the speech is directed to a public or private audience
teacher's speech "in a case such as the present one" where the comments were only
"tangentially" related to employment).
86. See, e.g., id. at 570 n.3 (noting the possibility of a different result in cases where
"the need for confidentiality is so great that even completely correct public statements
might furnish a permissible ground for dismissal," or where the employer and supervisor
have such a "personal and intimate" working relationship such that any criticism would
undermine the effectiveness of that relationship); id. at 572 (noting the possibility of a
different result in a case where the employee has greater access to the real facts than the
general public); id. at 573 n.5 (noting the possibility of a case where a teacher's statements
"are so without foundation as to call into question his fitness to perform his duties in the
classroom"); id. at 574 n.6 (noting the possibility of a different result if the employee's
statements were intentionally or recklessly false).
87. In addition to the cases discussed in the text, the Court also watered down public
employee speech rights in Mt.Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle,
429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977) (requiring employees to prove that their speech motivated the
decision to discipline). To be fair, some of the Court's decisions in this area have been
favorable for public employees. See, e.g., Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 379-80, 383
(1987) (protecting the constitutional right of a clerical employee in the constable's office
to say after Reagan assassination attempt, "[i]f they go for him again, I hope they get
him"); Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 411-13 (1979) (protecting a
teacher's complaints to the principal about racial discrimination at school).
88. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
89. For a more complete discussion of Connick and the confusion surrounding the
public concern inquiry, see Mary-Rose Papandrea, The Free Speech Rights of Off-Duty
Government Employees, 2010 BYU L. REV. 2117, 2125-27.
90. Connick, 461 U.S. at 146-47.
91. Id. at 147-48.
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and whether the speech calls for a specific change in the employee's
working conditions or invites a broader public debate concerning a
government entity. 92
Most recently, in its 2006 decision Garcetti v. Ceballos,93 the
Court held that a government employee has no First Amendment
rights at all when he is speaking "pursuant to [his] official duties."94
Garcetti invoked the old Holmesian principle that citizens who
become government employees "by necessity must accept certain
limitations on [their] freedom" so their employers can provide
services efficiently.95 The Court explained that restricting speech that
owes its existence to a public employee's professional responsibilities
does not implicate the First Amendment because the government has
a right to control what the government itself has created.96 Garcetti
expressly left open the question of whether the doctrine of academic
freedom provides teachers with some First Amendment rights in their
scholarship or teaching.' Even prior to Garcetti, however, lower
courts have been reluctant98to recognize the protections of academic
freedom for K-12 teachers.

92. See id. (distinguishing between speech that is merely of personal interest to the
employee and speech that is of public interest).
93. 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
94. Id. at 421.
95. See id. at 418 (citations omitted). For a discussion of the Court's return to the
Holmesian approach, see Paul M. Secunda, Neoformalism and the Reemergence of the
Right-Privilege Distinction in Public Employment Law, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 907, 94344 (2011).
96. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421-22 ("[Wjhen the government appropriates public funds
to promote a particular policy of its own it is entitled to say what it wishes." (quoting
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995))).
97. Id. at 425 (recognizing that the First Amendment might provide protection for
speech in the academic environment for which the public employee framework does not
account).
98. See, e.g., Lee v. York Cnty. Sch. Div., 484 F.3d 687, 694 n.11 (4th Cir. 2007)
(refusing to apply Garcetti in a case involving a high school teacher because "[t]he Court
explicitly did not decide whether [Garcettiapplies] ... to a case involving speech related to
teaching"); Mayer v. Monroe Cnty. Cmty. Corp., 474 F.3d 477, 479-80 (7th Cir. 2007)
(rejecting academic freedom for K-12 teachers); see also Sheldon Nahmod, Academic
Freedom and the Post-GarcettiBlues, 7 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 54, 63-64 (2008) (arguing
that Garcetti has little effect on K-12 teachers because "courts have uniformly ruled,
before and after Garcetti, that teachers in elementary and secondary education do not
have a First Amendment right of academic freedom to decide for themselves what should
be taught and how"); Developments in the Law: Academic Freedom, 81 HARV. L. REV.
1048, 1050 (1968) (arguing that although at the K-12 level "there is no strong tradition of
intellectual freedom comparable to that which has characterized the development of the
college and university," the quality of instruction requires freedom in the classroom and
intellectual integrity).
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The Supreme Court has decided three cases involving
public employee "off duty" speech that did not directly relate to
work. In United States Civil Service Commission v. National
Association of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO ("Letter Carriers"),99 the
Court upheld provisions of the Hatch Act, which prevents all federal
government employees from engaging in campaign activity."° The
Court applied Pickering'sbalancing test and upheld the law, deferring
to Congress's judgment that the rule is important to ensure that
government employees enforce and execute the law without
favoritism to a political party, to avoid the appearance of such
favoritism, and to protect government employees from coercion to
perform political acts in order to "curry favor" or maintain
employment.101

In the second case, United States v. National Treasury Employees
Union ("NTEU"),' ° the Court declined to give Congress the same
broad deference lawmakers enjoyed in Letter Carriers and struck
down a broad honoraria ban that prevented all federal employees
from accepting compensation for their off-duty expressive
activities. 3 The Court applied the Connick/Pickering framework. It
first held that the ban touched on matters of public concern, noting
that because the ban applied to off-duty expression, it concerned
speech employees make "as citizens."'0" The Court concluded that the
expressive activities subject to the ban satisfied Connick's public
concern requirement because they "were addressed to a public
audience, were made outside the workplace, and involved content
largely unrelated to their Government employment." 105 Moving on to
the Pickering balancing test, the Court stated that public employees
have the right to engage in expressive activities on their own time "as
citizens," absent some government interest in restricting those
activities that is "far stronger than mere speculation."'0 6 Unlike Letter
Carriers, in which the Court upheld a broad ban on political
campaigning, the Court declined to defer to Congress's judgment and
held that a broad honoraria ban was not sufficiently tailored to serve

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

413 U.S. 548 (1973).
Id. at 550-51.
Id. at 564-67.
513 U.S. 454 (1995).
See id. at 457.
Id. at 465-66.
Id. at 466.
See id. at 465-66, 475 (citations omitted).
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the government's asserted interest in avoiding impropriety. °7 With its
broad definition of what constitutes a matter of public concern and its
lack of deference to the government's asserted reasons for the
honoraria ban, NTEU appears to give government employees robust
protection for their off-duty, non-work-related expressive activities.
The third off-duty case, City of San Diego v. Roe,108 appears to
have undermined the broad protection NTEU offered. In Roe, a
police officer had listed for sale on eBay videos of himself "stripping
off a police uniform and masturbating."' 19 A per curiam Court
opinion stated that two tests have emerged for evaluating public
employees' free speech claims: the Connick/Pickering framework,
and then, from NTEU, a separate presumption of protection for
expressive activities "on their own time on topics unrelated to their
employment."'' 0 Roe stated that NTEU held that such speech is
protected absent a significant government justification,"' but NTEU
itself applied the usual Connick/Pickering framework.112 Some
commentators have argued that, after Roe, the Connick/Pickering
13
framework does not apply at all in off-duty, non-work-related cases,
although to date no lower courts have embraced this approach.
B. Applying the Public Employee Frameworkin Social Media Cases
Every step of the public employee framework outlined above
offers potential obstacles for teachers who challenge adverse
employment actions based on their social media communications.
Garcettileft unclear when teachers are acting pursuant to their official
job responsibilities as well as whether teachers enjoy any measure of
107. Id. at 472-77.
108. 543 U.S. 77 (2004) (per curiam).
109. Id. at 78.
110. Id. at 80.
111. Id. at 80-82.
112. See NTEU, 513 U.S. at 465-70.
113. See, e.g., Cynthia Estlund, Free Speech Rights That Work at Work: From the First
Amendment to Due Process,54 UCLA L. REV. 1463, 1468 (2007) ("City of San Diego, and
its reading of NTEU, appear to place an outer limit on the additional power of the
government over the speech of its employees. While that outer limit is a bit further from
the workplace than one might have expected, at some point along the spectrum of workrelatedness, the public employee apparently escapes the Connick-Pickering niche and
recovers her freedom as a citizen vis-A-vis the government."); Paul M. Secunda, Whither
the Pickering Rights of FederalEmployees, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 1101, 1108 (2008) ("The
only thing that is apparently clear concerning the job-relatedness of speech is that public
employee speech that occurs off-duty and is not work-related.., does not come under the
Pickering framework at all. Rather, under the NTEU line of cases, it is protected much
like normal citizen speech.").
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academic freedom to soften the decision's draconian effects. The
Court's decisions have also left unclear when social media
communications will pass the Connick public concern test and
whether the public concern test is even necessary when the speech is
not work-related. Finally, even if teachers can survive Garcetti and
Connick, they must overcome the uncertainty of the Pickering
balancing test, where it is unclear how courts should evaluate the
"value" of an employee's speech and whether adverse public reaction
is a relevant factor in evaluating the government's interest in
restricting the expression at issue.
1. Garcettiv. Ceballos
Garcetti did not explain what it means for employees to speak
"pursuant to their official duties" aside from mentioning that a job
description is not dispositive and that "[t]he proper inquiry is a
practical one."" 4 Indeed, Garcetti expressly refused to give lower
courts any guidance for defining the scope of an employee's duties."'
As a result, lower courts disagree about whether Garcetti applies
when an employee's speech is not required by, but is related to, his
job duties." 6 This question could arise in a number of different ways
in the social media context.
First, it is unclear whether a teacher's decision to use social
media as a pedagogical tool is "pursuant to official duties" when a
teacher is not "required" to do so. To date, only one court has
addressed this issue. In Spanierman v. Hughes,"7 a high school
teacher claimed he "used his MySpace account to communicate with
students about homework, to learn more about the students so he
could relate to them better, and to conduct casual, non-school related
discussions.""' The Spanierman court held that as long as a teacher is
not required to use social media, Garcetti does not apply." 9 It is not
114. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410,421,424-25 (2006).
115. Id.
116. Compare Williams v. Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist., 480 F.3d 689, 692-94 (5th Cir. 2007)
(holding that Garcetti barred an athletic director's First Amendment claim challenging his
termination after he wrote a memorandum to the principal questioning use of athletic
funds and reasoning that although the director was not required to write this letter, he
wrote it in his capacity as an employee, not a citizen), with Casey v. W. Las Vegas Indep.
Sch. Dist., 473 F.3d 1323, 1332-33 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding that speech of a school
superintendent was protected by the First Amendment because although her statement
was related to her employment, it "fell sufficiently outside the scope of her office").
117. 576 F. Supp. 2d 292 (D. Conn. 2008).
118. Id. at 298.
119. Id. at 309.
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clear whether all courts would adopt Spanierman's approach to the
applicability of Garcetti. In cases arising prior to Garcetti, some courts
held that a school has a right to control not just the content of
teachers' lessons but also the pedagogical methods they use.' 2
Indeed, some commentators have noted that school officials must
have the same ability to control the content of the curriculum and the
methods used to teach the curriculum because "[i]n many cases what
is taught is indistinguishable from how it is taught."' 121 For example,
the Third Circuit has held that the First Amendment offered no
protection to a teacher who used a pedagogical technique called
"LearnBall," which utilized attention-getting devices and rewards for
student performance in an attempt to improve productivity,
motivation, and behavior. 22 Teachers who use social media for the
reasons discussed in Part I.A-to improve communication with
students individually and as a class, to promote creativity and
collaboration, to promote student engagement and motivation, etc.are using social media as a pedagogical tool. Garcetti might give
schools absolute authority to prevent or restrict their teachers' use of
social media in this manner.
Answering the Garcetti question might depend upon how a
teacher is using social media. It is not much of a stretch to view
discussions of homework assignments on social media as part of a
teacher's job duties; it is less clear whether more casual conversations
with students on social media are considered part of a teacher's job.
As the facts of Spanierman demonstrate, a teacher might use social
media to have a mix of school-related and non-school-related
exchanges with her students. Unfortunately, even before social media
120. See, e.g., Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 910 F.2d 1172, 1176 (3d Cir. 1990)
("In this case, it is undisputed that defendants have determined that Learnball is not an
appropriate pedagogical method. They are entitled to make this determination."); see also
Lacks v. Ferguson Reorganized Sch. Dist. R-2, 147 F.3d 718, 723-24 (8th Cir. 1998)
(upholding dismissal of a teacher who permitted students to use profanity in the
classroom); Hetrick v. Martin, 480 F.2d 705, 707-09 (6th Cir. 1973) (holding that the First
Amendment does not give protection to a professor terminated because the university
administration did not approve of her teaching methods and educational philosophy,
which included giving students more responsibility to organize in-class and out-of-class
assignments); Ahern v. Bd. of Educ., 456 F.2d 399, 403-04 (8th Cir. 1972) (holding that a
teacher has no First Amendment right to use a nonconventional teaching method that
attempted to "shift[] to students many decisions customarily made by teachers").
121. Stephen R. Goldstein, The Asserted Constitutional Right of Public School
Teachers to Determine What They Teach, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1356 n.144 (1976).
122. Bradley, 910 F.2d at 1174, 1176 (holding that a school has the right to determine
what is not an appropriate pedagogical method).
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complicated the issue, it was unclear how much protection a teacher

receives for "extracurricular" comments to students, whether they
take the form of stray remarks during class or noncurricular
expressive activities before or after school, between classes or during
the lunch period, at school assemblies or athletic events, or on school
bulletin boards. 123 For example, the Seventh Circuit recently held that
Garcetti barred a First Amendment claim brought by a teacher who

was fired for making a stray remark in class that revealed her
personal anti-war beliefs. 124 Similarly, most courts-although not allhave applied Garcetti in cases where teachers used bulletin boards

inside their classrooms or elsewhere
in the school to post material not
25

directly related to the curriculum.
Indeed, it is not even clear whether Garcetti would apply if a
teacher used social media to communicate with students about solely
non-school-related topics. The line between "curricular" speech that
the school has a right to control as government speech and
"extracurricular" speech that retains at least some First Amendment

protection is unclear at best. Some courts have held that a school
retains the right to control what a teacher says to students not just
during class time or in their classrooms but any time those students
are required to be at school, including in between classes or at school
assemblies. 2 6 In explaining that "teachers do not cease acting as

teachers each time the bell rings or the conversation moves beyond
the narrow topic of curricular instruction,"' 27 the Ninth Circuit has
123. See Neal H. Hutchens, Silence at the Schoolhouse Gate: The Diminishing First
Amendment Rights of Public School Employees, 97 KY. L.J. 37, 62--64 (2008) (noting that
it is unclear whether Garcettiapplies to "speech made outside of class to students, such as
in the hall between classes, during the lunch period or perhaps even after school").
124. Mayer v. Monroe Cnty. Cmty. Sch. Corp., 474 F.3d 477, 478-80 (7th Cir. 2007)
(applying Garcetti to bar a teacher's First Amendment claim challenging her dismissal
based on her expression of anti-war sentiment during a class discussion of current events).
125. See, e.g., Borden v. Sch. Dist. of E. Brunswick, 523 F.3d 153, 171 n.13 (3d Cir.
2008) (holding that if Garcetti applies in an educational context, it would bar a First
Amendment claim of a football coach who participated in student-led prayer in the locker
room); Caruso v. Massapequa Union Free Sch. Dist., 478 F. Supp. 2d 377, 384 (E.D.N.Y.
2007) (declining to grant summary judgment based on Garcetti in a case where a teacher
posted a picture of George Bush on a classroom bulletin board); see also Downs v. L.A.
Unified Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1003, 1006, 1009, 1013 (9th Cir. 2000) (rejecting a teacher's
claim, prior to Garcetti,where the teacher claimed he had a First Amendment right to post
on a bulletin board in the school's hallway materials objecting to the school's gay and
lesbian awareness month, as posting on the bulletin boards constituted government
speech).
126. See, e.g., Johnson v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 658 F.3d 954, 967-68 (9th Cir.
2011).
127. Id.
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explained that teachers are "never just... ordinary citizen[s]" 128 given
"the position of trust and authority they hold and the impressionable
young minds with which they interact." 129 Some courts have similarly
held that teachers continue to speak as employees when they hold
"optional" class sessions or meetings off school grounds.13 A possible
argument based on these cases is that it is essentially impossible for a
teacher to communicate directly with students without the students
(and the larger school community) regarding this speech as
representing the voice of the school. Other courts have defended the
right of teachers to communicate as "private" citizens with students
after school hours, even if on school grounds.'31
Accordingly, it is possible that the government (whether a
school, school district, county, or state) would attempt to rely on
Garcetti to defend either its decision to punish a teacher for social
media communications with students or the constitutionality of social
media bans or restrictions that prevent teachers from having such
conversations at all. The likelihood of the government prevailing on
this issue will depend on how broadly a court interprets Garcetti's
scope. It will be harder, although not impossible, for the government
to rely on Garcetti to defend a policy that restricts or punishes a
teacher for communications with students about topics that are not
obviously school-related.
2. Public Concern Requirement
Even if a teacher can survive the Garcetti threshold inquiry,
many social media cases will struggle to survive the public concern
test. First, some courts have held that speech involving curricular and
pedagogical choices is not a matter of public concern because it is
"nothing more than an ordinary employment dispute. 13 2 Other
128. Peloza v. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 37 F.3d 517, 522 (9th Cir. 1994).
129. Johnson, 658 F.3d at 968.
130. See Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1076 (11th Cir. 1991) (rejecting a professor's
First Amendment claim that his employer-university could not prohibit him from giving
optional out-of-class lectures on the "Christian Perspective" that were connected to his
coursework); see also Braswell v. Bd. of Regents, 369 F. Supp. 2d 1371, 1371, 1373, 1380
(N.D. Ga. 2005) (denying First Amendment claims on qualified immunity grounds where
a cheerleading coach allowed students to come to her home for optional prayer sessions).
131. Wigg v. Sioux Falls Sch. Dist. 49-5, 382 F.3d 807, 807, 815 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding
that a teacher had a First Amendment right to attend with students a religious meeting
held after school hours at school).
132. See, e.g., Boring v. Buncombe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364, 368 (4th Cir. 1998)
(holding that a teacher's First Amendment claim based on the selection of a play for
students' theatrical performance was not a matter of public concern); Kirkland v.
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courts have disagreed. 33 It is unclear how courts would apply the
public concern inquiry in cases involving a teacher's in-class
noncurricular speech.1 " This means that even if a teacher is punished
for discussing political affairs with his students on social media, a
court might hold that the speech is not a matter of public concern.
Connick makes clear that complaining about work on social media is
unlikely to pass the public concern test unless the speech presents
broader issues of public importance.135 Social media communications
that simply discuss personal information will also fail Connick's
test. 136
On the other hand, statements that clearly relate to matters of
public concern are more likely to receive protection, even if they are
offensive. For example, a school district in Florida initially suspended
a teacher who wrote on his personal Facebook page "that gay
marriage is a 'cesspool' that makes him vomit and mocks God," but it
later reinstated him, presumably because the school's lawyers

believed that the First Amendment would likely protect what the
teacher said on his own time about a matter of obvious public

Northside Indep. Sch. Dist., 890 F.2d 794,802 (5th Cir. 1989) (stating that a claim based on
a teacher's selection of books for an optional reading list was an "ordinary employment
dispute" and not a matter of public concern).
133. See, e.g., Cockrel v. Shelby Cnty. Sch. Dist., 270 F.3d 1036, 1051-52 (6th Cir. 2001)
(rejecting the argument that a teacher's speech relating to curricular issues can never be a
matter of public concern); Kingsville Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Cooper, 611 F.2d 1109, 1113 (5th
Cir. 1980) ("[Cjlassroom discussion is protected activity."); see also Boring, 136 F.3d at
378-79 (Motz, J., dissenting) ("Although [the claimant's] in-class speech does not itself
constitute pure public debate, obviously it does 'relate to' matters of overwhelming public
concern....").
134. At least one judge has recognized the possibility that a teacher's in-class
noncurricular speech should be given more protection than a teacher's in-class curricular
speech. See Boring, 136 F.3d at 372-73 (Luttig, J., concurring).
135. See, e.g., Richerson v. Beckon, No. C07-5590 JKA, 2008 WL 833076, at *4 (W.D.
Wash. Mar. 27, 2008), affd, 337 F. App'x 637 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that a blog post
criticizing a new employee and boss did not satisfy the public concern test); Leslie Brody,
Paterson Teacher Suspended for Facebook Post Should Be Fired, Judge Rules,
NORTHJERSEY.COM (Nov. 8,2011), http://www.northjersey.com/news/Paterson-teacher
suspended forjFacebookpost should_be_.fired-judge-rules.htmlc=y&page=2 (reporti
ng an administrative law judge's decision involving a teacher who said she felt like "a
warden for future criminals").
136. See, e.g., Spanierman v. Hughes, 576 F. Supp. 2d 292, 310-11 (D. Conn. 2008)
(noting in dicta that a teacher's communications with other users and his creative writing
on MySpace did not touch on matters of public concern and that only a poem about the
Iraq War satisfied the test); Snyder v. Millersville Univ., No. 07-1660, 2008 WL 5093140, at
*15-16 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 2008) (holding that a student-teacher's MySpace page contained
only personal information and therefore failed the public concern requirement).
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concern, especially because the school had failed to demonstrate that
his speech caused any problems at school.'3 7

Courts currently disagree about whether the public concern
requirement should apply at all in cases involving off-duty speech
unrelated to the workplace.' 38 As Judge Richard Posner explained in
one of the leading cases arguing against the public concern approach,
"[t]he First Amendment protects entertainment as well as treatises on
politics and public administration." '39 As a result, Posner continued,
the government should be required to give a good reason for
punishing an employee even for speech on matters of private
concern. 4° Posner suggested that in cases involving off-duty
expression, courts should skip Connick's public concern test and
simply conduct a Pickering balancing test, where the value of the
speech could be taken into account.' 4 ' Other courts have continued to
apply Connick in off-duty cases but have taken a broader view of
what constitutes a matter of public concern 142 or have stated that the
43
public employee framework is simply inapplicable. 1
3. Pickering Balancing Test
The outcome of the Pickering balancing test is entirely fact
dependent and therefore uncertain. Although the test may
appropriately balance the interests of teachers and students with
respect to work-related expression, it offers insufficient protection for
teachers' non-work-related expressive activities. Specifically, on the
"value" side of the balance, some courts have expressed concern that
public employees will effectively have little right to engage in "free,
uncensored artistic expression-even on matters trivial, vulgar, or
profane"-if only political speech is given significant weight.'44
137. See Padgett, supra note 9.
138. See Papandrea, supra note 89, at 2139-58 (providing a more extensive discussion
of the confusion in the lower courts).
139. Eberhardt v. O'Malley, 17 F.3d 1023, 1026 (7th Cir. 1994).
140. Id. at 1027.
141. Id. at 1026-27.
142. See, e.g., Berger v. Battaglia, 779 F.2d 992, 997-99 (4th Cir. 1985) (holding that an
officer's nightclub music performances were a matter of public concern).
143. See, e.g., Wigg v. Sioux Falls Sch. Dist. 49-5, 382 F.3d 807, 815 n.5 (8th Cir. 2004)
(refusing to apply the Pickering balancing test in a case involving a teacher's private, offduty expression).
144. See Berger, 779 F.2d at 999-1000; see also Flanagan v. Munger, 890 F.2d 1557,
1564-65 (10th Cir. 1989) (holding that "it makes little sense" to apply the public concern
test in cases involving nonverbal expression "that does not occur at work or is not about
work").
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On the employer's side of the balance, it is unclear whether
courts should consider public reaction to an employee's speech. In the
education context, disruption often takes the form of students
refusing to take a teacher's classes, parental complaints that
overwhelm the school's administrative staff, and bad publicity more
generally. Courts disagree over whether to take into account this sort
of public reaction to the teacher's speech. Some courts have held that
actual or threatened disruption to the functioning of a government
entity is an appropriate consideration. 145 For example, the Second
Circuit held that allowing the government to cite parental outrage
when it was discovered that a teacher was a member of the North
American Man/Boy Love Association ("NAMBLA") was
appropriate because, without the cooperation and participation of
parents, "public education as a practical matter cannot function. 146
Other courts have disagreed, noting that "[w]ith the greatest of
respect to [complaining] parents, their sensibilities are not the full
measure of what is proper education."'' 47 Along the same lines, some
courts have explained that permitting consideration of the public's
reaction is equivalent to permitting a typically impermissible
"heckler's veto.' 1 48 Some courts have tried to dodge the heckler's
veto issue by holding that the requisite disruption is shown not by the
public reaction itself but rather the internal disruption caused in the
government workplace when 1it49 has to divert its resources to respond
to an adverse public reaction.
C. Applying Student Freedom of Speech Cases to Public School
Teachers
Although the Court has a well-developed (albeit unclear and
overly complex) doctrine for analyzing the First Amendment claims
145. See, e.g., Meltzer v. Bd. of Educ., 336 F.3d 185,199 (2d Cir. 2003).
146. Id. at 199.
147. Keefe v. Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359, 361-62 (1st Cir. 1969) (extending First
Amendment protection to a teacher's decision to assign a magazine article containing the
word "motherfucker" despite protests by parents).
148. See, e.g., Flanagan,890 F.2d at 1566-67 ("The Supreme Court's rejection of the
heckler's veto lends support to our holding that the defendants have only an attenuated
interest in preventing plaintiffs' speech."); Berger, 779 F.2d at 1001 ("Historically, one of
the most persistent and insidious threats to first amendment rights has been that posed by
the 'heckler's veto,' imposed by the successful importuning of government to curtail
'offensive' speech at peril of suffering disruptions of public order.").
149. See, e.g., Eaton v. Harsha, 505 F. Supp. 2d 948, 969-70 (D. Kan. 2007) (recognizing
an actual disruption to the internal functioning of a police department caused by having to
respond to public criticism of an employee's blog posts).
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of public employees, some lower courts deciding cases involving
public school teachers have applied the significantly different
framework that has developed for student speech rights.
A year after Pickering, the Court famously recognized in Tinker
v. Des Moines Independent Community School District5 ° that
teachers and students do not "shed their constitutional rights ... at

the schoolhouse gate."' 51 Nevertheless, the Court continued, these
rights must be "applied in light of the special characteristics of the
'
school environment."152
The Court concluded that a school can
restrict student speech at school only if it "materially and
substantially" disrupts the work of the school or invades the rights of
others.153
The Court's subsequent cases have deviated from Tinker's
material disruption standard to impose greater restrictions on the
speech rights of students. For example, students have no right to
engage in lewd or obscene language at school 54 or to engage in
expression that school officials reasonably regard as advocating drug
use,155 regardless of whether the speech disrupts school or interferes
with the rights of others. In curbing student speech rights even when
the expression does not disrupt the learning environment, the Court
has explained that the process of education must not be "confined to
books, the curriculum, and the civics class; schools must teach by
example the shared values of a civilized social order."' 56
Although some courts have invoked Tinker in cases involving
teachers, 157 in recent years the student speech decision upon which
the lower courts most frequently rely is Hazelwood School Districtv.
Kuhlmeier.'58 In that case, the Supreme Court held that schools had
broad authority over the "expressive activities that students, parents,
150. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
151. Id. at 506.
152. Id.
153. Id at 513-14 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)).
154. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675,685 (1986).
155. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 397 (2007).
156. Fraser,478 U.S. at 683.
157. See, e.g., Roberts v. Madigan, 921 F.2d 1047, 1056-57 (10th Cir. 1990) ("We find
no reason here to draw a distinction between teachers and students where classroom
expression is concerned."); James v. Bd. of Educ., 461 F.2d 566, 572 (2d Cir. 1972)
(applying Tinker to a teacher's decision to wear an armband where the school made no
showing that the armband interfered with school activities); Parducci v. Rutland, 316
F. Supp. 352, 355-56 (M.D. Ala. 1970) (applying Tinker to the question of whether a
teacher's selections of reading materials for her students were appropriate).
158. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
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and members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the
imprimatur of the school."15' 9 Hazelwood involved a challenge to a
principal's censorship of student-written articles about divorce and
teen pregnancy slated to appear in the school newspaper."JO After
concluding that the newspaper was not a public forum, 161 the Court
held that the school's authority to restrict student speech was not
limited to expression that substantially impeded its work or
undermined the rights of other students.16 Instead, the Court held,
educators are permitted to control student speech in schoolsponsored activities such as newspapers and theatrical productions
that "may fairly be characterized as part of the school curriculum,
' 163
whether or not they occur in a traditional classroom setting,"
provided that "their actions are reasonably related to legitimate
pedagogical concerns. ' ' "6 The Court explained that giving schools
broad deference to restrict student speech in school-sponsored
activities "is consistent with our oft-expressed view that the education
of the Nation's youth is primarily the responsibility of parents,
teachers, and state and local school officials" and that judicial
intervention under the First Amendment is permitted only when a
'
censorship decision "has no valid educational purpose."165
Given
Hazelwood's deferential "legitimate pedagogical concerns" test,
teachers typically lose when courts
apply that case to their classroom
1 66
decisions.
curricular
or
speech
Courts disagree on whether the student speech cases should play
a role in analyzing First Amendment claims of teachers punished for
159. Id. at 271.
160. Id. at 263.
161. Id. at 267-70.
162. Id. at 271.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 273.
165. Id.
166. See, e.g., Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 456 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding unprotected a
teacher's discussion of abortion of Down's Syndrome fetuses during class); Miles v.
Denver Pub. Schs., 944 F.2d 773, 778 (10th Cir. 1991) (upholding disciplinary action
against a teacher who commented during class on rumors about two students fornicating
on school grounds); see also Boring v. Buncombe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364, 375-78
(4th Cir. 1998) (Motz, J., dissenting) (arguing for a more rigorous application of the
Hazelwood standard); Alan Brownstein, The NonForum as a FirstAmendment Category:
Bringing Order out of the Chaos of Free Speech Cases Involving School-Sponsored
Activities, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 717, 775-76 (2009) ("[T]he range of concerns
determined to be 'legitimate' and 'pedagogical' is so broad that one can only wonder
whether anything meaningful is accomplished by requiring courts to ask and answer the
question.").
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their curricular or pedagogical decisions or other forms of in-class
speech. 167 Although some courts have held that the public employee
framework controls all teachers' First Amendment claims, 168 other

courts instead have applied Hazelwood's "legitimate pedagogical
concerns" test'69 or have applied an amalgam of the two
approaches. 170 To justify applying Hazelwood, lower courts have
noted that the government employee speech cases fail to "address the
significant interests of the state as educator."'' Although recognizing
that Hazelwood was a student speech case, some courts claim that the
172
reasoning of the decision applies just as persuasively to teachers.
These courts note that a teacher's classroom speech bears the same
imprimatur of the school as a student contribution to the school
newspaper."' In addition, these courts argue that restricting teacher
speech can be just as necessary as restricting student speech in order
for a school to achieve its pedagogical goals'74 and that the classroom
is a nonpublic forum subject to reasonable restrictions.'75 Others have
argued in favor of Hazelwood because the public employee
framework fails to "provide[ ] much assistance in assessing whether [a

167. For an in-depth analysis of the disagreement in the lower courts, see Emily Gold
Waldman, Returning to Hazelwood's Core: A New Approach to Restrictions on SchoolSponsored Speech, 60 FLA. L. REV. 63, 79-87 (2008).
168. See, e.g., Borden v. Sch. Dist. of E. Brunswick, 523 F.3d 153, 168-69 n.8 (3d Cir.
2008) (applying Pickering and Connick); Mayer v. Monroe Cnty. Cmty. Sch. Corp., 474
F.3d 477, 480 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding that the First Amendment does not permit teachers
to stray from the school system's curriculum); Cockrel v. Shelby Cnty. Sch. Dist., 270 F.3d
1036, 1048 (6th Cir. 2001) (applying the public concern balancing test).
169. See, e.g., Lacks v. Ferguson Reorganized Sch. Dist. R-2, 147 F.3d 718, 724 (8th Cir.
1998); Silano v. Sag Harbor Union Free Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 42 F.3d 719, 723 (2d Cir.
1994); Ward, 996 F.2d at 453; Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1072-74 (11th Cir. 1991);
Miles, 944 F.2d at 775.
170. See, e.g., Lee v. York Cnty. Sch. Div., 484 F.3d 687, 694-96 (4th Cir. 2007)
(applying both Pickering and Hazelwood); Kirkland v. Northside Indep. Sch. Dist., 890
F.2d 794, 795 (5th Cir. 1989) (same); Nat'l Gay Task Force v. Bd. of Educ. of Okla. City,
729 F.2d 1270, 1274 (10th Cir. 1984) (holding that a school can satisfy Pickeringonly when
it can satisfy Tinker's substantial disruption standard); Columbus Educ. Ass'n v. Columbus
City Sch. Dist, 623 F.2d 1155, 1159-60 (6th Cir. 1980) (applying the public employee
framework but also noting that the teacher's speech did not cause substantial disruption
under Tinker).
171. See, e.g., Miles, 944 F.2d at 777.
172. See, e.g., id.
173. Ward, 996 F.2d at 453; Miles, 944 F.2d at 776; Kirkland, 890 F.2d at 800-01.
174. See, e.g., Silano, 42 F.3d at 722; Miles, 944 F.2d at 777.
175. Ward, 996 F.2d at 453; Miles, 944 F.2d at 776; Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066,
1071 (11th Cir. 1991).
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teacher's in-class speech] is entitled to constitutional protection." 176
Connick's public concern inquiry is unworkable, critics contend,
because a teacher's in-class speech is "neither ordinary employee
workplace speech nor common public debate," and the government's
interest in restricting teachers' speech does not typically rest in
concerns for "workplace efficiency or harmony" but rather a need to
control speech for pedagogical reasons.'77
Garcetti's bright-line rule eliminating First Amendment
protection for speech made in the course of job duties means that
courts no longer have to rely on Hazelwood to give schools robust
authority to control the speech of their teachers in the classroom.
Nevertheless, it remains important to consider the application of the
student speech cases. Some courts have held that Garcetti does not
apply in cases involving teachers because the Court expressly left
open the possibility that teachers are afforded the protections of
academic freedom. 178 Furthermore, it remains unclear after Garcetti
when a teacher is speaking as a citizen or as an employee. If Garcetti
is interpreted narrowly, it may not apply in cases where a teacher is
not required to use social media. Hazelwood, by contrast, may apply
even if a teacher has not spoken pursuant to her official job duties as
long as the teacher is using social media to communicate with
students for at least partly pedagogical reasons 179 and "students,
parents, and members of the public might reasonably perceive [the
speech] to bear the imprimatur of the school.' 8 A court applying the
deferential Hazelwood standard is likely to accept that concerns
about maintaining the boundary between teachers and students
justify restrictions on a teacher's use of social media to communicate
with students. It is unlikely that a court would apply Hazelwood in
cases where a teacher is not communicating directly with her students
because in such cases the speech is not part of the curriculum and
does not reasonably bear the imprimatur of the school.
Given that in many social media cases it may not be possible to
use Hazelwood, the question then becomes whether courts might
176. See, e.g., Boring v. Buncombe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364, 378 (4th Cir.
1998).
177. Id.

178. See, e.g., Lee v. York Cnty. Sch. Dist., 484 F.3d 687, 694 n.11 (4th Cir. 2007)
(applying Pickering post-Garcetti).
179. See Spanierman v. Hughes, 576 F. Supp. 2d 292, 298 (D. Conn. 2008) (recounting
how a teacher used social media to communicate with students about homework but also
about non-school-related subjects in order to get to know the students better).
180. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260,271 (1988).
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invoke Tinker's substantial disruption standard, or even the
prohibitions on speech that contains lewd or suggestive language or
advocates for illegal drug use.18' The Supreme Court has not
determined whether the rules arising out of its student speech cases
apply when students are not at school or participating in a schoolsponsored activity.182 If these rules can be applied to students' offcampus speech, it is possible that some courts will apply them to
teachers' off-campus speech.
D. Which Frameworkis More Speech Protective?
Courts disagree about whether the public employee or student
speech framework provides more protection for teachers' speech
rights. 83 With the relatively recent Garcetti decision stripping public
employees of First Amendment protection for speech made pursuant
to their job duties, teachers may find the public employee framework
provides less protection, depending on how broadly a court interprets
the job of a teacher. Furthermore, even if a teacher can survive
Garcetti,it is unclear what, if any, protection the Pickering framework
provides for speech that does not implicate a matter of public
concern. The student speech framework does not have a bright-line
rule rejecting First Amendment protection in cases that involve onthe-job speech or matters of private concern. The only bright-line
rules that come into play in the student framework are the
prohibitions of lewd or profane speech or speech that advocates
illegal drug use.
On the other hand, the Pickering framework offers more robust
protection for speech on matters of public concern because courts
must balance the value of the speech against the school's interest in
restricting it. 184 Hazelwood gives schools broad power to restrict
speech that undermines a legitimate pedagogical goal without
conducting any sort of balancing test that weighs the importance of
the speech at issue; teachers can prevail only when school officials fail
to offer a legitimate educational purpose.'85 Tinker similarly does not
require balancing but instead requires a school to demonstrate a

181. See supra notes 154-56 and accompanying text.
182. See Mary-Rose Papandrea, Student Speech Rights in the Digital Age, 60 FLA. L.
REV. 1027, 1054-71 (2008) (discussing disagreement among lower courts).
183. See Waldman, supra note 167, at 86.
184. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
185. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273; see supra note 166 and accompanying text.
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threat of substantial disruption. 186 That said, courts conducting the
Pickering balancing test may end up reaching the same conclusion as
a court using Hazelwood if these courts give little weight to a
teacher's expression and great deference to a school's asserted
pedagogical interests. As a result, Tinker may offer the most
protection because a school must demonstrate not just interference
with its pedagogical interests but threatened disruption to the school
environment. 187
III. PROPOSED APPROACH

As the prior Part demonstrated, it is clear that the First
Amendment rights of public school teachers stand on unstable
ground. The application of Hazelwood and Garcetti to teacher speech
threatens to strip teachers of First Amendment protection for any
speech they might direct toward their students, whether inside or
outside the classroom. It is also unclear what, if any, constitutional
protection teachers have for speech unrelated to their job duties when
it does not implicate a matter of public concern or when it engenders
a hostile community reaction. The lower courts' disagreement about
whether the public employee cases adequately take into account the
unique circumstances of the school environment has only added to
the confusion.
At the outset, it is important to distinguish between laws or
regulations that prohibit teachers from using social media as a
pedagogical tool and broader restrictions that prohibit teachers from
using social media to communicate with students about both
curricular and extracurricular subjects. Social media policies that
focus solely on the use of social media as a pedagogical tool stand a
much better chance of surviving constitutional scrutiny under current
doctrine than broad policies that forbid teachers from using social
media to communicate with students for any purpose. Most current
social media bans and restrictions, however, are broad policies that
prohibit teachers from using social media to communicate with their
186. See, e.g., Kingsville Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Cooper, 611 F.2d 1109, 1113 n.4 (5th Cir.
1980) (ruling in favor of a teacher after rejecting the school district's argument that Tinker
should apply in a case involving a controversial pedagogical method).
187. Some scholars have noted that if the Pickeringbalancing test is applied vigorously
so as to require the same sort of substantial disruption Tinker requires, the tests may not
be very different. See Paul Secunda, The (Neglected) Importance of Being Lawrence, 40
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 85, 122 n.184 (2006) (arguing that the Pickering balancing test is
really equivalent to a substantial disruption test and accordingly not much different from
Tinker).
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students not merely as part of the educational enterprise but for any
purpose whatsoever. These policies fail constitutional scrutiny no
matter what analytical framework is used to analyze them, whether
the student speech framework, the public employee framework, or
the time, place, and manner doctrine.

Teachers should enjoy robust First Amendment rights when
they use social media networks in a noncurricular manner. Rather
than applying the student speech framework, courts should apply a
significantly revised public employee framework. Garcetti should be
applied narrowly so that it applies only in cases where teachers use
social media to communicate with students for curricular purposes.
Moreover, Connick's public concern inquiry should be eliminated
because it permits schools to restrict teacher speech without having to
make any showing that the speech interferes with the educational
mission in any way. Furthermore, in cases involving non-work-related
expression, courts should abandon the Pickering framework entirely.
Instead, courts should afford such speech presumptive constitutional
protection that can be overcome only when the school can
demonstrate a substantial nexus between the challenged expression
and the teacher's ability to perform her job. This nexus requirement
will be more easily met in cases involving a teacher's direct
communications with students because schools have a much stronger
and more legitimate interest in restricting what teachers say directly
to students than they do when students are not the intended audience.
This proposed "nexus" test revises the public employee doctrine in a
way that simultaneously recognizes the right of schools to take a
teacher's "off-duty" speech into account in determining whether a
teacher is fit for the classroom and provides teachers with adequate
breathing space for their expressive rights when they are speaking as
citizens.
The Need to Reform and Clarify the DoctrinalFrameworkfor
Teachers' FirstAmendment Rights
In determining the appropriate framework for analyzing the free
speech rights of teachers, it is important to establish at the outset that
teachers and students should be treated differently, particularly with
respect to speech that takes place outside of the classroom. As others
have noted, one simple reason why the Court's student speech
jurisprudence should not apply to teachers is that these cases all

A.
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involved students."8 More significantly, teachers and students are not
similarly situated. Applying student-centric speech rubrics to
teachers' claims undervalues teachers' status as educators,
professionals, and citizens. l g9
The courts do not need a special test for teachers distinct from
the test that applies to public employees generally. The framework
for analyzing the First Amendment rights of public employees
already takes into account the special needs of the government to
control the speech of its employees. Indeed, the public employee
framework has been applied to teachers, as was the case in Pickering.
Although Hazelwood does not bar all First Amendment claims
relating to work-related expression or involving a matter of public
concern, its deference to a school's legitimate pedagogical interests
gives the government more power than necessary to control the
speech of its employees. What is needed is a reconsideration of the
public employee framework, not a complete rejection of it in favor of
a doctrine developed for a different population.
Although teachers should be treated like public employees, the
current framework for public employee speech rights requires
significant revisions. The draconian threshold tests of Garcetti and
Connick have already proven unworkable and should be eliminated.
In cases involving non-work-related expression-in other words,
cases in which the speech is not made in the scope of a teacher's
professional duties and does not discuss school matters-courts
should not apply Pickering's balancing test. Instead, courts should
give the speech presumptive constitutional protection that can be
overcome only if school officials can demonstrate a substantial nexus
between the expression and the teacher's fitness and ability to
perform his job.

188. See, e.g., Waldman, supra note 167, at 66 ("Hazelwood was a student speech case,
and its rationale and approach are uniquely suited to that context."); Alexander Wohl,
Oiling the Schoolhouse Gate: After Forty Years of Tinkering with Teachers' First
Amendment Rights, Time for a New Beginning, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 1285, 1309-10 (2009).
189. See Karen C. Daly, Balancing Act: Teachers' Classroom Speech and the First
Amendment, 30 J.L. & EDUC. 1, 13 (2001) ("The use of an undifferentiated standard for
students and teachers ignores the legal distinctions and different level of constitutional
protection afforded to children and adults, resulting in insufficient protection for teacher
speech and contributing to the denigration of teachers as professionals."); see also
Waldman, supra note 167, at 79-87 (discussing the division among the circuits as to
Hazlewood's reach).
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1. Limit Garcetti
As noted above, courts have struggled since Garcetti to
determine when an employee is speaking "as an employee"
performing official job duties or "as a citizen.""19 The problems with
Garcetti are both theoretical and practical. As a theoretical matter,
public employees do not cease to be citizens even when they are
performing their jobs, and they do not cease to be employees when
they are away from work. The foundation for Garcetti is the
government speech doctrine and the idea that the government has a
right to control whomever is speaking for it. Although this concept
may have a workable application in some contexts-such as a
government spokesperson-in many professions, like teaching, no
reasonable person would regard all expression in the classroom as
representing the official views of the employer. It is one thing if a
teacher decides not to teach the subjects and material designated in
the school curriculum. It is quite another to assume that every stray
remark a teacher makes in class, on a school bulletin board, or to a
student in between classes is government speech that the school is
entitled to control without limit.
As a practical matter, it is not easy to determine when Garcetti
applies, particularly in the educational context and especially in cases
involving social media. The Court stated that Garcetti applies
whenever an employee is performing official job duties, but lower
court decisions have revealed how difficult it is to determine the
scope of those duties.'9 1 It is particularly difficult to determine when a
teacher is speaking pursuant to her job duties. Even when a teacher
communicates with students about topics that are not directly school
related, these kinds of interactions can play an important role in the
educational process, especially in the primary and secondary school
context. Social media makes it even more difficult to determine when
a teacher is speaking pursuant to her job duties because a court
cannot rely on temporal and geographic clues to draw a line between
"teacher" and "citizen." A teacher can use social media to
communicate with students from any location, at any time of day or
night.
Garcetti expressly left open the question of whether teachers are
entitled to the protections of academic freedom under the First
190. For a discussion of issues arising since Garcetti,see supra text accompanying notes
114-31.
191. See supra text accompanying note 116.
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Amendment, and it is beyond the scope of this Article to resolve that
issue fully. 192 That said, it would make sense to give teachers some
protection for the decision to use social media as a pedagogical tool.
Although in some cases teaching methods may arguably interfere
with the right of state and local communities to make value
judgments regarding what they want their students to learn in the
public schools, the use of social media does not, by itself, pose any
threat to any discernable value judgment a community might make. It
would be one thing if a school district were to ban a particular social
networking website because it somehow conflicts with asserted
community values or, if in a particular instance, school officials
determined that the use of social media has disrupted the learning
process or impaired classroom discipline. It is quite another to
maintain a generally applicable policy that prohibits teachers from
using social media in their teaching.
But because most, if not all, current social media policies do not
merely limit curricular uses, it is not necessary to resolve the issue of
whether teachers should have some right to decide how to teach a
subject (distinct, perhaps, from any right to decide what should be
taught). This Article merely argues that Garcetti should be read
narrowly such that it does not apply when a teacher uses social media
to communicate with students for noncurricular purposes. Although
in some cases it may be difficult to draw a line between the curricular
and noncurricular use of social media, courts should define curricular
use as narrowly as possible such that it applies only in cases where
students are required to use, view, or post content on social media to
complete an assignment or participate in a class activity, not when
teachers have more informal communications with their students
through social media, even if about school-related matters. 193
192. For discussion of whether teachers are entitled to the protection of academic
freedom under the First Amendment, see generally Theresa J. Bryant, May We Teach
Tolerance? Establishing the Parameters of Academic Freedom in Public Schools, 60 U.
PiTr. L. REV. 579 (1999); Daly, supra note 189; Paul Forster, Teaching in a Democracy:
Why the Garcetti Rule Should Apply to Teaching in Public Schools, 46 GoNz. L. REV. 687
(2011); Nahmod, supranote 98; Martin H. Redish & Kevin Finnerty, What Did You Learn
in School Today? Free Speech, Values Inculcation, and the Democratic-Educational
Paradox, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 62 (2002); W. Stuart Stuller, High School Academic
Freedom: The Evolution of a Fish Out of Water, 77 NEB. L. REV. 301 (1998).
193. Under this approach, the manner in which the teacher in Spanierman acted would
seem to follow outside of Garcetti, but more facts are needed to make that determination.
It appears that the teacher primarily used social media to get to know his students better,
but the record indicates that he also communicated with students about their homework.
Spanierman v. Hughes, 576 F. Supp. 2d 282, 298 (D. Conn. 2008). If students were
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2. Discard Connick
The Court should also discard Connick's threshold public
concern requirement. Even if it were possible to develop a workable
standard to determine whether expression involves a matter of public
concern, carving out from First Amendment protection all expression
that does not satisfy this standard grossly undermines the First
Amendment rights of employees without any demonstrated
governmental need to restrict speech.
Connick itself involved work-related speech, and by limiting First
Amendment protection to work-related speech that involved a matter
of public concern, the Court hoped to prevent the
constitutionalization of employee grievances. 194 Some courts applied
the public concern requirement to strip teachers of First Amendment
protection for any of their expressive activities related to the
classroom.'95 The public concern requirement also undermines the
constitutional protection for teachers' off-duty expressive activities.
Determining what speech constitutes matters of public concern is a
difficult inquiry. Cases involving teacher complaints about their
students and schools on social media illustrate this difficulty perfectly.
Although such comments may correctly be regarded as a teacher
simply complaining about her job, in many cases these comments can
equally be taken as providing important insights into the workings of
the public school system. A threshold public concern inquiry
potentially chills valuable speech without requiring any showing that
the expression affects the government's ability to conduct its mission.
The unfairness of Connick's threshold requirement is most
apparent in cases involving non-work-related expression, which is
frequently what appears in social media cases. The Supreme Court
has left unclear whether the public concern inquiry applies in this
context, and lower courts are divided on the issue.'96 The courts that
are unwilling to extend the public concern test in off-duty cases
correctly recognize that the First Amendment has always protected
much more than simply expression about political and governmental
affairs. Although speech on matters of public concern is generally
regarded as having high First Amendment value, speech on matters
required to communicate with the teacher via social media to discuss their homework, the
use would be curricular, but facts we do know suggest that all the communications the
teacher had with his students were informal and primarily not related to school.
194. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 154 (1983).
195. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
196. See supra text accompanying notes 138-43.
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of private concern can be equally as valuable to the speaker and
listener.
B.

Broad Social Media Bans and Restrictions

Laws or rules restricting or banning teachers from using social
media to communicate with their students for noncurricular purposes
should be struck down as unconstitutional. These rules fail
constitutional scrutiny regardless of whether a court applies the
public employee framework, Hazelwood, or a time, place, and
manner test.
Under the current public employee framework, the school would
argue that the First Amendment does not give a teacher the right to
use social media for pedagogical purposes (because the
communications relate to work duties and therefore Garcetti will
most likely apply)1 97 or that communications to students necessarily
fail Connick's public concern test. The problem is that most if not all
of the current social media policies do not merely restrict the use of
social networks for pedagogical purposes. 198 Accordingly, Garcetti
likely will not bar a facial challenge unless a court takes the unlikely
position that any communication a teacher has with a current student
is part of the teacher's job. 199 Connick is also unlikely to support these
laws and regulations because they tend not to have any exceptions for
communicating with students about non-school-related topics that
may be of great public concern. Such communications can be of great
value, and a school does not have an interest in preventing all of
them. Similarly, social media bans or restrictions are likely to fail the
Pickering balancing test for the same reason the honoraria ban in
NTEU failed that test: the rules are not sufficiently tailored to serve
the government's interest.
Hazelwood is also unlikely to provide much support for these
restrictions. Even if a court were willing to hold that all
communications a teacher has with his students are somehow related
to the curriculum and bear the imprimatur of the school, the broad
social media restrictions that schools have adopted do not serve a
legitimate pedagogical goal. Although some courts have given schools
broad authority to control not just course content but also the
197. For a discussion of the restrictions public employers are allowed to place on their
employees, see supra Part II.A.
198. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
199. Laws or policies like Missouri's that also ban communications with former
students are even less likely to find protection under Garc'etti.
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educational tools used to communicate that content,2°° most of the
social media bans in place today go far beyond restricting the use of
social media as a pedagogical tool.201 Furthermore, even social media
policies limited in this manner could have a difficult time surviving
Hazelwood because courts might be unwilling to accept a school's
assertion that it is necessary to ban teachers from communicating with
students through social media. Using social media to communicate
with students is not an inherently bad thing; indeed, as discussed in
Part I, many educators increasingly regard social media as providing a
multitude of educational benefits.
Only one court to date has addressed the constitutionality of a
social media ban without applying either the public employee
framework or Hazelwood.2 That court, sitting in Missouri, applied
the traditional time, place, and manner test and entered a preliminary
injunction striking down a state law that prohibited teachers from
using any non-work-related
social networking site that allowed
"exclusive access ' 20 3 to current and former students, holding that "the
breadth of the prohibition is staggering. ' '2° ' Under the time, place,
and manner test, restrictions on a medium of communication are
constitutional as long as they serve a substantial government interest,
the government interest "is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression," and the restriction is no greater than necessary to serve
that interest.205 The court noted that social media is often the only
way that teachers can communicate with their students. 6 In addition,
the broad ban would prohibit teachers from talking to their own
children who are students. 7
The Missouri court was correct to conclude that the broad social
media ban at issue in that case failed the time, place, and manner test.
Social media bans like Missouri's do not restrict what teachers can say
to students; instead, they single out a particular mode of
200. See supra text accompanying notes 120-21.
201. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
202. See Amended Order Entering Preliminary Injunction at 2-3, Mo. State Teachers
Ass'n v. State, No. 11AC-CC00553 (Mo. Cir. Aug. 26, 2011), 2011 WL 4425537.
203. S.B. 54, 96th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2011). The statute defines
"exclusive access" as occurring when "the information on the website is available only to
the owner (teacher) and user (student) by mutual explicit consent and where third parties
have no access to the information on the website absent an explicit consent agreement
with the owner (teacher)." Id.
204. Amended Order Entering Preliminary Injunction, supra note 202, at 2.
205. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
206. Amended Order Entering Preliminary Injunction, supra note 202, at 2.
207. Id.
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communication perceived as particularly dangerous. Although
schools certainly have a substantial interest in maintaining the
boundaries between teachers and students, social media bans are not
sufficiently tailored to achieve this goal. Even though the Missouri
law was particularly problematic because it included former students
and did not have an exemption permitting teachers to communicate
with their own children, even more limited social media bans are
constitutionally problematic because they restrict too much speech.
Such bans would apply even if the teacher is part of the same social
network with a student in a non-school-related organization,
including religious, athletic, or political groups.
Rather than banning or restricting communications between
teachers and students on social media, schools should focus on
restricting harmful communications themselves, regardless of the
media in which they occur. Under the nexus approach outlined below,
a school would be able to punish teachers for inappropriate
communications with students. This approach permits teachers to
take advantage of all the benefits social media has to offer while
permitting schools to restrict speech that is truly harmful.
C. ProposedNexus Approach for Non-Work-Related Expression
The public employee doctrine is based on the recognition that
when the government is acting as an employer, it needs to have
greater authority to restrict the speech of its employees than it does
when it is acting as a sovereign attempting to restrict the speech of
ordinary citizens. If Garcetti is read narrowly and Connick's public
concern requirement eliminated, Pickering's balancing test does a
respectable job of protecting teachers' work-related expression.
Comments that attack particular students, teachers, or administrators,
for example, undermine the teacher's ability to be trusted in the
classroom and may undermine the teacher's professional
relationships in her school community. More general comments about
the state of the school, administrative decisions, or the community
may anger members of that community, but they are more likely to
make a valuable contribution to public discussion about the school
system and educational issues.
With respect to non-school-related expression, however, courts
should not apply Pickering but should instead adopt a test that offers
presumptive protection for such speech that the school can overcome
whenever it can demonstrate a substantial nexus between that speech
and the teacher's fitness and ability to perform his job. This proposed
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test is refreshingly simple yet offers the government adequate
authority to restrict a teacher's speech when it is important to do so.
A nexus approach finds support in cases in which teachers have
been punished for their off-duty conduct. Considering the law in this
area is especially relevant given that in many cases where teachers are
punished for posting online content-such as Ashley Payne's case
involving drinking pictures 2° 8 -it is hard to know whether the school
is punishing the teacher for engaging in inappropriate speech or for
the underlying conduct. Traditionally, courts evaluating challenges to
conduct-based dismissals used a "role model" test to determine
whether teachers can be punished for their off-duty conduct," 9 but
more recently courts have tended to embrace a nexus approach that
requires schools to demonstrate that the challenged conduct directly
affects the performance or effectiveness of the teacher." 0
Commentators have noted that this shift to a nexus test reflects "that
over the years courts have come to be somewhat more protective of
the personal lives of educators. 2 11 For example, there was a time
when courts upheld the termination of teachers based on out-ofwedlock pregnancies or sexual orientation, but no court has reached a
similar holding since the 1970s. 12 In addition, although historically 21a3
school district might punish a teacher for drinking in public,
208. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
209. See, e.g., Toney v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough Sch. Dist., 881 P.2d 1112, 1114
(Alaska 1994) ("[I]t is well-established that there need not be a separate showing of a
nexus between the act or acts of moral turpitude and the teacher's fitness or capacity to
perform his duties."); Zelno v. Lincoln Intermediate Unit No. 12 Bd. of Dirs., 786 A.2d
1022, 1024 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2001) (permitting discharge for "immoral" conduct provided
"that the conduct claimed to constitute immorality actually occurred, that such conduct
offends the morals of the community, and that the conduct is a bad example to the youth
whose ideals the teacher is supposed to foster and elevate").
210. See, e.g., Morrison v. State Bd. of Educ., 461 P.2d 375, 386-87 (Cal. 1969) (listing
factors a court can consider in determining whether a teacher is "unfit to teach"); Lehto v.
Bd. of Educ. of Caesar Rodney Sch. Dist., 962 A.2d 222, 227 (Del. 2008) (requiring nexus).
211. See Ruth L. Davison, John L. Strope, Jr. & Donald F. Uerling, The PersonalLives
and ProfessionalResponsibilities of P-12 Educators: Off-Duty Conduct as Grounds for
Adverse Employment Actions, 171 EDUC. L. REP. 691, 691 (2003).
212. Id. at 701 (out-of-wedlock pregnancy); id. at 703 ("[O]nly 30 year old cases
demonstrate an employer prevailing in instances of adverse actions based on sexual
orientation."). Indeed, in 1974 the Supreme Court struck down a mandatory school board
rule requiring all pregnant teachers-married or not-to take leave several months prior
to the birth of the child. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 642-43, 651
(1974).
213. See generally Horosko v. Mount Pleasant Twp. Sch. Dist., 6 A.2d 866 (Pa. 1939)
(upholding termination of a teacher who worked part-time as a waitress and bartender
and who drank and gambled in front of customers, some of whom were students).
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modern courts are split on whether even a driving under the influence
conviction can be a sufficient basis for termination. 214 Accordingly,
one ironic twist of the current state of the law is that a teacher like
Ashley Payne might find that she is more likely to win a lawsuit if the
school says it fired her for the underlying conduct-drinking-than if
it says she was fired for posting a picture of that conduct on her social
media profile.
Courts should take care to examine both the validity of the
school's purported mission as well as the nexus between the school's
mission and the need to restrict the teacher's speech under review.
Courts should not be permitted to assert that the challenged
expression shows a lack of judgment or sets a bad example.
Furthermore, community outrage alone should be insufficient to
demonstrate inability to perform a job. Although community reaction
may be based on justifiable concerns about a teacher's fitness, it may
instead be based on intolerance for unpopular and minority opinions
or unduly high standards for the way a teacher lives her life outside of
work.
In evaluating whether the nexus requirement is met, courts
should take into consideration whether the teacher knowingly and
directly communicated with students, perhaps by "friending" them on
Facebook or by sending them direct messages on Twitter. As
discussed in Part I, it is difficult for any social media user to guarantee
that no one but the intended audience will see her comments. This
concern is not present when a teacher is communicating directly with
students. Furthermore, when a teacher has direct communications
with students-whether through social media or in the school
hallway-there is a greater concern that the teacher's expression will
have an undue influence on those students. In other words, it is
important to distinguish between situations when a teacher like
Ashley Payne posts drinking pictures on her social media profile
without intending for her students to see them and those situations
where a teacher intentionally sends such pictures to students.
Although a teacher might not intend to communicate as a "teacher,"
teachers should assume that their minor students will regard them in
214. Compare In re Termination of Kibbe, 996 P.2d 419, 424 (N.M. 1999) (stating that
the school board's termination of a teacherfor a driving while intoxicated conviction and
not cooperating with police was arbitrary and capricious because there was no evidence
these actions had any relationship to the teacher's competence as a teacher and coach),
with Zelno, 786 A.2d at 1026 (upholding dismissal of a teacher convicted of drunk driving
three times because her actions constituted immorality that was a bad example to youth).
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that role-and be influenced accordingly-whenever they are having
direct communications. Furthermore, inappropriate interactions with
students-such as sexually charged conversations-can be sufficient
on their own to indicate unfitness because they indicate, at best, that
the teacher cannot maintain the appropriate boundary between
teacher and student, and, at worst, that the teacher might sexually
abuse students. 15
A school might still be able to satisfy the nexus requirement with
respect to a teacher's social media communications that are not
directed at students, but it will be much more difficult to do so. The
outcome of a nexus test does not depend on whether the teacher is
speaking about a matter of public or private concern; instead, what
matters is whether the communications reveal unfitness to serve as an
educator. For example, any communications indicating sexual
relations with a minor, or a belief that such relations are appropriate,
would satisfy the nexus requirement because the school community
reasonably would not be able to trust that teacher with minor
children. 6 Schools should also be able to punish teachers based on
comments that reveal the teacher is not performing her job duties.217
By contrast, pictures or communications regarding alcohol or drug
use, revelations of unpopular political positions, the use of profanity,
and pornographic pictures do not by themselves indicate unfitness for
the educational profession.
To be sure, even under this proposed test, the First Amendment
rights of teachers will remain somewhat uncertain from case to case,
but its benefits far outweigh its costs. Under this approach, schools
could not simply argue that a teacher's speech reveals that she is a
poor "role model" for students or that community outrage rendered
the teacher ineffective. The nexus test is also preferable to the
Pickering balancing test or the Tinker substantial disruption test.
Pickering offers insufficient protection for speech that does not

involve a matter of public concern because such speech is not valued
and too easily outweighed by the school's preferred reasons for
silencing it. Tinker's substantial disruption test is appealing but fails
215. Courts generally do not tolerate a teacher's sexual misconduct with students or
other minors without expressly finding a nexus, see Davison et al., supra note 211, at 691
n.1 (citing a number of cases), but it is not difficult to imagine how a nexus requirement
would be satisfied in such situations.
216. See, e.g., Meltzer v. Bd. of Educ., 336 F.3d 185, 200 (2d Cir. 2003) (upholding
dismissal of a teacher who was a member of NAMBLA).
217. For example, schools should be able to punish teachers if they discover through a
teacher's confessions on social media that she took a sick day to go on vacation.
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to take into account a school's interest in disciplining teachers whose
speech may not be disruptive but nevertheless indicates unfitness to
teach. Rather than formally labeling teachers as speaking "as
employees" or "as citizens," the nexus approach recognizes that the
two cannot be neatly separated. The proposed nexus test focuses on
when a teacher's speech truly undermines a school's interests as an
employer while respecting a teacher's free speech rights as a citizen.
CONCLUSION

Teachers around the country are increasingly finding
themselves in trouble for their use of social media in and out of the
classroom. In such cases, the application of the two potential legal
frameworks to evaluate their First Amendment rights-the public
employee doctrine and the student speech doctrine-are unclear and
potentially grant schools an unjustifiable amount of power to restrict
teachers' speech. Teachers are also more frequently getting in trouble
for posting content deemed inappropriate or unprofessional during
their personal time. No doubt relying on the current uncertain yet
plainly speech-restrictive state of the law, increasing numbers of
school districts and legislative bodies have enacted laws and
regulations that ban teachers from using social media to communicate
with their students.
This Article contends that no matter what legal framework is
used, social media bans are unconstitutional because they do not
merely forbid the use of social media for pedagogical purposes but
restrict far more speech than is necessary to prevent inappropriate
communications between students and teachers. Moreover, these
bans fail to recognize the great value of social media as a pedagogical
tool and a communicative platform. Instead of demonizing a mode of
communication that is playing an increasingly important role in
American society, schools should instead focus on restricting harmful
speech itself.
The doctrinal framework governing the First Amendment rights
of teachers is in dire need of clarification and reform. This Article
contends that the public employee speech framework should apply in
all cases involving teachers, but this framework needs major revisions.
Specifically, the Garcetti rule stripping public employees of all First
Amendment protection for their work-related speech should be
eliminated or at least narrowly construed so that it applies only when
teachers are engaged in curricular expression. Connick's public
concern requirement should be eliminated because it gives schools
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unwarranted control over their teachers' speech. Finally, although a
rigorous version of Pickering's balancing test is appropriate for a
teacher's work-related expression, it offers insufficient protection for
non-work-related speech. Instead, courts should give such speech
presumptive constitutional protection but permit public educational
employers to overcome this presumption by demonstrating a
substantial nexus between the speech and a teacher's ability and
fitness to perform her professional duties. The increasing importance
of social media as a communications platform renders these reforms
more essential than ever. Teachers should not be required to use
social media at their peril.

